Journal X
Volume 5
Number 1 Autumn 2000/Spring 2001

Article 10

2001

Who Likes Short-Shorts: Jokes, Genre, and Ex-Positions of
"Woman"
Susan Rochette-Crawley
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Rochette-Crawley, Susan (2001) "Who Likes Short-Shorts: Jokes, Genre, and Ex-Positions of "Woman","
Journal X: Vol. 5 : No. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Studies in English at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal X by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.

Rochette-Crawley: Who Likes Short-Shorts: Jokes, Genre, and Ex-Positions of "Woman"

Who Likes Short-Shorts:
Jokes, Genre, and Ex-Positions of “Woman”
Susan Rochette-Crawley

Susan Rochette-Crawley teaches at the Uni
versity ofNorthern
Iowa, where she spe
cializes in short story
and narrative theory
and also writesfiction.

No doubt, just as watchmakers usually
provide
particularly good movement
with similarly valuable case, so it may
happen with jokes that the best achieve
ments in the way of jokes are used as an
envelope for thoughts of the greatest
substance.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to

the Unconscious
A minor literature doesn’t come from a
minor language; it rather that which a
minority constructs within major lan
guage.
—Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka:

Toward a Minor Literature
1.

The charge that the short story is a “major” form
belies the fact that it continues to be studied
a
“minor” genre. It curious that in this age of theo
ry and practice the short story remains one of the
most theoretically “deterritorialized” narrative genres.
Though many critics and students of the genre would
vehemently protest against its “minor” or “marginal”
status, it nevertheless remains a fact that, with one or
two exceptions, no extensive study of the short story
as either a narratively major or minor form is cur
rently in print. Regardless of the reasons why such an
obvious lack of critical attention to the short story
exists, a review of the corpus of critical writing nev-
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ertheless appears to mitigate against the popularity of the short story as a seri
ous venue for many fiction writers. The present essay seeks to some extent to
offer an explanation of the genre’s “minor” status among critics while remaining one of the most “seriously playful” forms within which many current and
past “major” writers create.
Though it would be impossible, in the short scope of this essay, to offer a .
theoretical framework for discussing the major versus minor status of the short
story in general, by examining a few examples of the subgenre of the short
short story in light of Deleuze and Guattari’s first qualification of a minor lit
erature — that it bears a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” — it becomes
possible to understand how the short story has managed to retain its major sta
tus among writers while at the same time remaining a critically marginal genre.
Moreover, by considering the genre and its subsidiary forms in light of Freud’s
work on the tendentious joke as an example of a “minor” narrative genre, some
light shed not only on the narrative functions of short-short stories but also
on the question of how major versus minor literary status is conferred upon a
popular yet marginal form that to some extent depends on its marginal status
to retain its major effect.
Deleuze and Guattari describe three characteristics of a minor literature: 1)
the deterritorialization of language, 2) the connection of an individual to a
political immediacy, and 3) a collective assemblage of enunciation (18). In
order to adapt the concept of minor literature to a study of a genre within a
major language, this essay will focus on describing and evaluating the deterri
torialization of a genre: the short-short story. By deterritorialization of genre
is meant the way in which a genre — in this case the short-short story — acts
a passage point into “territory” not usually seen
territory the genre usual
ly occupies. In this case, the deterritorialization of genre signifies a space of
freedom, a territory of genre wherein experiment and inversion take place in
spite of the rigid controls of generic convention. Freud’s work on the genre of
the joke in his Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious will likewise be adapt
ed to demonstrate first the similarity between the narrative operations of the
joke and the short-short story, and second how these generic similarities are
operative within the short-short subgenre. Short-short stories by Kafka, Petronious, Colette, and Woolf have been chosen to examine generic deterritorial
ization and the narrative operations shared by both short-shorts and jokes.

2.
The relationship between the short story and the joke has not gone unremarked
by critics of the short story. Walter Allen, in his The Short Story in English, cites
the joke as the present-day survivor of the oral tale and notes that “[v]ery few
jokes, written down, would seem much Eke modern stories. They might very
well, though, remind us of many of Boccacio’s tales in skeleton form. This
throws light on the relationship of the modern story both to the joke and to
tales of earlier times” (4). Although Allen does not examine this relationship
and implies that it is one in which dissimilarities dominate, at least one short
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story critic, Clare Hanson, notes that the short-story writer Saki “frequently
uses the frame of the practical joke for the purpose of unmasking, revealing
something hidden beneath the surface of life” (47). Hanson adds that the plea
sure this unmasking yields in Sakis stories is connected to the workings of the
unconscious in the same way as in the joke. According to Freud:

A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has
occurred to us “involuntarily.” What happens is not that we know a
moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it needs
to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I
can best compare with an “absence” a sudden release of intellectual tension,
and then all at once the joke is there as a rule ready-clothed in words.
167)

We shall return to the crucial role that “absence” plays in both the joke para
digm and the short-short, but for now it is enough to note that Hanson’s use of
Freud’s formula constitutes the only specific correlation that has been made to
date between the short story and Freud’s text. Furthermore, in regard to short
stories with “trick” or surprise endings (such as those written by both Saki and
O. Henry), Hanson perceptively situates the reader in the position of the “lis
tener,” or necessary third person, in Freud’s tendentious joke paradigm (47).
Hanson’s use of Freud signals a formal recognition of the connection
between the short story and the joke, but it also presents a veiled threat to the
critical status of the short story. For although both Saki and O. Henry are
admittedly “major” short story writers, both have been accused of being “minor”
artists for having written in the highly formulaic, technically prefabricated style
for which they are known. Their works have often been cited
examples of
what the short-story genre can be reduced to in the hands of “sensationalists,”
and the beginning writer is admonished not to imitate their methods. In addi
tion, though they are both considered to be “short-story writers,” it is in the
subgenre of the short-short that some of their most memorable work has been
done.
Paradoxically, it is precisely because their short-short stories (O. Henry’s
“The Gift of the Magi” and Saki’s “The Open Window,” for example) are so
closely related to the joke paradigm that their effects as stories are ensured and
the writers’ reputations so tarnished. Does this then mean that a study of the
short-short by way of the structure of jokes will “short-circuit” at the outset,
will amount only to a catalogue of the gimmickry at the writer’s disposal and
therefore an implicit admission that the short story is, after all, a “minor” genre?
At least two factors guard against this outcome. First, not all short-shorts
are as transparently related to the joke paradigm as those of Saki and O. Henry.
Second, the joke-work itself,
articulated by Freud, is not as easily appropri
ated as it may seem. After all, there are “good” jokes and “bad” jokes, success
fully and unsuccessfully told ones. As Freud notes, the defining characteristic
of what constitutes a joke elusive and lies not simply in the joke technique
nor in the pleasure that the joke affords its creator Jokes 145). Furthermore,
“the joke-work is not at everyone’s command, and altogether only a few people
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have a plentiful amount of it; and these are distinguished by being spoken of as
having wit’” (140). In this regard the successful joker is not unlike the creative
writer, as for both the success of their craft originates in play with words and
partakes of the workings of the unconscious as it also manifests itself in the
dreamwork (170). As for jokes themselves, they have a “subjective determi
nant” that indicates that

[o]nly what I allow to be a joke is a joke. What is a joke to me may mere
ly be a comic story to other people. But if a joke admits of this doubt, the
reason can only be that it has a facade — in these instances a comic one —
in the contemplation of which one person is satiated while another may try
to peer behind it. A suspicion may arise, moreover, that this facade
intended to dazzle the examining eye and that these stories have therefore
something to conceal.
(105-6)
Furthermore, by not being at the disposal of all tellers, the joke becomes a high
ly deterritorialized genre, one that by its own nature inherently removed from
the language in which it told.
What Freud suggests here is that the joke — any joke — paradigmatic.
The joke itself is an “envelope” for a thought that would otherwise not be
expressed (92). In other words, “the substance of a joke is independent of the
joke and the substance of the thought, which is here, by means of a special
arrangement, expressed as a joke.” The “special arrangement” — the joke par
adigm — involves three people: the “first person” (teller), the “second person”
(object of the joke), and the “third person” (the listener). In textual terms we
can revise this paradigm in any one of several ways:
first person/writer, sec
ond person/text, third person/reader; or 2) first person/narrator, second person/narrated, third person/narratee; or 3) first person/reader, second person
text, third person/context. Each revision corresponds to and overlaps with cer
tain theories of textual production: intentionality and reader response, textual
hermeneutics, and Marxist/materialist theories of the cultural production of
textual identity. By superimposing the joke paradigm we can establish a psy
choanalytic criticism that can incorporate, rather than be reduced to, a diversi
ty of critical approaches to textuality (Brooks 112).
Thus we find that at least two factors safeguard a study of the correlation
between the short-short and the joke against a reductivist cataloguing of tech
niques: jokes themselves cannot be reduced to such a catalogue; and they pos
sess a “subjective determinant” that implicates both creator and listener in the
process of construction and deterritorializes the genre. Thus the rich potential
of the joke paradigm enables us to discuss the short-short itself a facade that
“dazzles” and “conceals,” a facade that the writer “exposes” and that we as read
ers “try to peer behind.” Jokes and short-shorts, mutually reliant upon brevity
and economy to achieve their effect, share Freud’s requirement for abbreviation
(Jokes 42).
The technique of using brevity, as Freud noted in his connection with the
seminal joke borrowed from Heinrich Heine, is related to other techniques
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such as condensation, multiple use of the same material, and double meaning.
Freud notes that the element common to these techniques is "a question of
economy” (42). But
not every economy of expression, not every abbreviation, on that account
a joke as well. . . . There must be some peculiar kind of abbreviation and
economy on which the characteristic of being a joke depends; and until we
know the nature of that peculiarity our discovery of the common element
in the techniques of jokes brings us no nearer to a solution of our problem.
(20)

The problem Freud refers to is that of discovering the psychical process that
characterizes both the production of jokes in the first person and the pleasure
they produce in the listener. As regards the listener, Freud writes, "laughter
arises if a quota of psychical energy which has earlier been used for the cathexis
of particular psychical paths has become unusable, so that it can find free dis
charge” (Jokes 147). The joke thus “lifts” the inhibitory cathexis in the listen
But the creator of the joke barred from participating in this same psychic
process if the joke is to succeed — nothing ruins a joke more readily than if the
joker begins laughing in the process of telling the joke. Therefore, the psychi
cal process the creator undergoes differs from that of the listener. In his char
acteristically dualistic fashion, Freud offers two explanations for the process: 1)
no inhibitory cathexsis is lifted for the listener, or 2) there an “interference”
with the possibility of discharge that may arise from the application of the lib
erated cathectic energy to some other endopsychic use. The teller of the joke,
in telling it, produces the force that lifts an inhibition by economizing a psychic
expenditure of energy within the joke itself, thus clearing the way for the lis
tener, who brings little or no psychic investment to the joke, to receive its plea
sure.
Jokes, like dreams, are “overdetermined” according to Freud. Both employ
the processes of displacement, condensation, and indirect representation. In
both jokes and dreams, brevity results in condensation. Clearly, the literary
genre of the short-short story shares with both the joke and the dream this
reliance upon condensation through brevity to achieve its effect. However,
short-shorts require, as do jokes, a listener actively engaged in the textual
process.
Brevity, in both jokes and short-short stories, serves the purposes of com
munication: a joker, like a writer, must “capture” the listener in a relatively short
period of time. Jokes are short both because there is not much time in which
to tell them and because, owing to the nature of their dynamic, they accentuate
the ephemerality of perception. Short-shorts, as imitations of the joking
process, duplicate the joke’s advantage of brevity and are thus aligned with the
“economy of psychical expenditure” offered by the joke.
In order to trace more closely the thread weaving Freud’s discussion of
economy in the joke with that of economy, or brevity, in the short-short, it
helpful to subject Freud’s analysis to type of “secondary revision” by consider
ing it in light of a story by Franz Kafka. Because the story, “Absent-Minded
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Window Gazing," is so short, it is possible to reproduce it here in English
translation.

Absent-Minded Window Gazing
What are we to do with these spring days that are now fast coming on?
Early this morning the sky was gray, but if you go to the window now you
are surprised and lean your cheek against the latch of the casement.
The sun
already setting, but down below you see it lighting up the
face of the little girl who strolls along looking about her, and at the same
time you see her eclipsed by the shadow of the man behind overtaking her.
And then the man has passed by and the little girl’s face is quite bright.
(Kafka 387)

Revision of Freud’s analysis here involves substituting the “first person” of the
narrative for the “first person” of the joke. We will temporarily bypass the
authorial position and triangulate the text into narrator, narrated, and narratee:
we will make use, in other words, of our second revision of the joke paradigm.
In doing this we find that the narrator is itself split into the “we” of the first
line and the “you” of the end of the first paragraph. At the same time, the nar
ratee stands outside the text, in the third-person position,
listener to a text
that is simultaneously implicating the reader and constructing the reader as
Other. In this way, the first revision of Freud’s paradigm is superimposed onto
the second.
In this superimposition, the “second person” of the joke/text is the narrat
ed: the setting of the window, the sun setting, the girl, the man, the act of
eclipsing, the brightening of the girl’s face, and so on. . In the second revision,
the “second person” is the text, including the narrator, the narrated, and the nar
ratee. The revisions and superimpositions can be schematized as illustrated:

JOKE/SHORT-SHORT

Third Person
(Listener)
narratee/reader

First Person
(Teller)
narrator/writer

YOU/READER

WE/YOU

Second Person
(Told)
Narrated/text

In the second paragraph of Kafka’s story, the “first person” we/you conjures
the inhibition that is to be lifted by putting the “third person” you/reader in
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sympathy with the young girl walking in the sun. Thus when the shadow of the
man eclipses her, the you/reader’s inhibition against the ominousness of this act
lifted by a narrative sleight of hand — it only his shadow that comes into
contact with her face. But his threatening potential as abductor or molester
alluded to by his approach from “behind overtaking her.” The last line lifts the
inhibition, passing over the you/reader as the shadow passes over the girl’s face;
like the girl’s face, the you/reader is psychically left “quite bright” as well. At
the same time, because the reader as “you” is implicated in the process of con
structing the joke/text, the we/you “economizes” the lifting of the inhibition by
emphasizing the mutual construction of the narrative itself, thus crediting the
reader with the creation of the text/joke s/he also receives.
Kafka’s peculiar use of both the third-person plural and second-person uni
versal pronoun makes the story especially well-suited to a revision of Freud’s
analysis. Because the pronoun chain allows the reader to participate in both the
first- and third- person positions of the joke paradigm, the “economy of psy
chical expenditure” flows continuously through the narrative. The economic
chain of the story is interrupted only by the reader’s position outside the text,
by her awareness of herself as being in the position of listener. Once the read
er disengages from the narrative, she finds herself in the same position as that
of the third person; that is, the story can now be retold and passed on to the
next listener.
This story originates in a textually preconscious “thought”: “spring is as
fresh and vulnerable to change as a young girl alone on a street.” Given over to
unconscious revision, the “vulnerable to change” manifests itself as the man’s
shadow overtaking the girl. The season’s vulnerability is displaced to the shad
ow’s eclipse of the girl, whose brightened face restores triumph to spring’s abil
ity to overcome changing weather. The story makes use ofjoke techniques such
as displacement, allusion, condensation and substitution. And both the we/you
and the you/reader participate in the “economy of psychical expenditure”
offered by the joke paradigm and set into motion by Kafka’s shift in point of
view from the first-person plural to the second-person “you,” which can be
taken as either singular or plural or both and so completes the circularity of the
joke chain.
The success of the story, and the success of a joke, depends on the reader’s
having been “captured” by the punch line, or moment of closure. There is a
marked similarity between the success of a joke as described by Freud — hid
den similarities are revealed between dissimilar things, sense emerges out of
nonsense, bewilderment yields to illumination — and the success of a short
short. Irving Howe agrees that in the short-short, “[everything depends on
intensity, one sweeping blow of perception” (xi).
In the joke the liberated cathectic energy finds its release, for the listener,
in laughter. Though Kafka’s story is not “funny” in this sense, the release of psy
chical energy experienced in the moment of closure constitutes a type of Kristevan “laughter of the text” on the part of the reader. In fact, a revision of the
tendentious joke paradigm in terms of what Freud calls “woman’s inflexibility”
(the first condition of smut according to Freud) is itself a type of “motor dis
charge,” an expenditure that places woman simultaneously in the subject and
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object position and allows her access to the joking chain as the “first person,” or
teller of the joke (Kristeva 224-5).
Brevity and psychical expenditure, or closure, then, are two Freudian char
acteristics shared by the joke and the short-short. The third quality, absence,
what Freud calls a “sudden release of intellectual tension,” is, in the short-short,
precisely the nature of the creative condition. The writer, as Freud notes in his
essay on daydreaming and creativity, must occupy a place of absence in order to
create. In Kafka’s story, this connection
underscored by the title itself:
“Absent-Minded Window Gazing.”
That short-shorts depend not only on brevity and closure but also on the
presence of an absence is substantiated by the work of any number of writers.
For instance, in O. Henry’s story, “The Gift of the Magi,” the success of the
ending turns on this play between presence and absence in the “presents” the
couple “present” each other with at Christmas: both gifts are purchased at the
price of the very thing that the other sacrificed for. The girl sells her hair to
buy the boy a watch fob; the boy sells his watch to buy a comb for the girl’s hair.
In Petronius’s story, “The Wife of Ephesus,” the soldier attempting to
seduce the wife faithfully mourning her dead husband wins his aim by cajoling
her with the presentation of a meal as a substitute for the absence of her hus
band. Death, he declared to her, the common end and last home of all men,
enlarging on this and other commonplaces generally employed to console a
wounded spirit (262). The absence of the crucified body of a criminal (which
the soldier had been entrusted to guard) that was stolen while he seduced the
wife
what prompts her to offer her husband’s body as a substitute for the
missing body of the criminal in order that the negligent soldier not be execut
ed for failing his duty. It is this action, on the part of the wife, that effectively
moves her, as woman, from the position of object, or “butt,” of the seduction
joke into the subject position, as a third-person listener becomes the first-per
son teller of her own joke. The punch line of this textual joke coincides with
the moment of closure in the story:
“The gods forbid,” she cried, “I should at one and the same time look on
the corpses of two men, both most dear to me. I had rather hang a dead
man on the cross than kill a living one.” So said, so done; she orders her
husband’s body to be taken from its coffin and fixed upon the vacant cross.
The soldier availed himself of the ready-witted lady’s expedient, and next
day all men marvelled how in the world a dead man had found his way to
the cross.
(Petronius 265)
The wife’s action, as well as her response to the seduction, has earned her the
reputation as the paradigmatic “fickle woman.” A revision of the story by
means of the joke paradigm reveals the wife of Ephesus as the heroine of her
own seduction: society would deny her, in her widowhood, any sexual satisfac
tion, yet she plays society’s “rules” against themselves to take control of her own
future. In short, within a deterritorialized genre, the wife succeeds in deterri
torializing society’s expectations concerning her.
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3.
Only jokes with a purpose run the risk of meeting with people who don’t want
to listen to them.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious

Tendentious jokes, according to Freud, serve an aim, and “where a joke not
an aim in itself there are only two purposes that it may serve. . . . [I]t is either
a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire or defense) or an
obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure) (Jokes 97). For woman in the
position of object, or “butt,” of the joke, purposes of hostility and obscenity are
necessarily conflated: in either case, woman is to be “kept in her place” within
the scheme of male domination. Feminist critics working with Freudian texts
often find that Freud himself provides the paradigm that allows woman access
to the subject position in the textual/joking chain. As Jerry Aline Flieger pro
poses, “'she,’ however offended by the male conspirators, refuses to leave the
room feeling ashamed” (960).
According to Freud, it “woman's inflexibility,” her refusal to yield to man’s
attempts at sexual exposure, that constitutes the “first condition” for the devel
opment of the obscene joke. Thus, woman is simultaneously the inhibition
underlying the joke and the source of cathectic liberation once this inhibition
is lifted. In other words, in her “inflexibility” woman has access to all three
positions on the joking chain. Her inflexibility is itself a superimposition of the
three stages of the psychical process of the joke: 1) the inflexibility that renders
woman unwilling to acknowledge herself
the butt of the joke reenacts the
first-person position, in which the teller is unable to laugh at the joke in the
telling of it; 2) that inflexibility is also the “absence” from which the joke aris
involuntarily; and 3) inflexibility, whether a matter of attitude or of the lit
eral stiffening of the body, is itself a “cathectic response,” a “motor discharge”
(albeit nonhysterical) that aligns woman with the third-person position on the
joking chain, that of the listener whose inhibitions are lifted by the joke.
Moreover, in Freudian terms, “woman’s incapacity to tolerate undisguised
sexuality” is nothing less than her refusal to have exposed as her sexuality the
pseudo-sexuality of herself as “castrated man” constructed out of man’s own
refusal to tolerate his homoerotic nature. The obstacle to man’s desire, in other
words, is not woman but man’s own inhibitions regarding his homoerotic
nature. Woman in the tendentious joke paradigm serves as the displaced object
of man’s “desire” for the company of his own, not the Other’s, company. Her
refusal to allow herself to be used this way (evidenced by her own cathectic
response of not laughing at the obscene joke) is a powerful deterritorialization
both of herself and of the joking chain to which she would be denied entrance.
Thus, woman, who through her refusal to participate in the joke with the
same type of cathectic response as men finds access to the joking chain,
becomes the Medusa who laughs, rightly, at man, who in his own homophobic
fear insists that woman herself cannot be looked upon directly. The short-short
story, so closely related to the paradigm of the joke, enables women writing to
overdetermine themselves as subjects and to gain direct access to the power of
the punch line in such a way as to “ex-pose” themselves as beyond male ridicule.

Published by eGrove, 2001

9


148

Journal X, Vol. 5 [2001], No. 1, Art. 10

Journal .x

For instance, in Colettes “The Hidden Woman” (“La Femme Cache”) the
figure of the male doctor finds himself simultaneously exposed to woman’s
repressed desire and liberated by the free expression of that desire through a
double-edged joke that the doctor and his wife each play on each other. Both
the doctor and the wife tell each other that they won’t be going to the green and
purple masked ball: the doctor because he says he will be with a patient and
the wife because of feigned modesty. In fact, unbeknown to each other they
both attend the ball, the doctor beneath a cowl and domino, the wife dressed as
Pierrot. Fascinated by the Pierrot, the doctor startled to hear it give a cough
and an “ahem” very much like that of his wife. When the Pierrot scratches “its”
thigh, “with a free and uninhibited gesture,” the doctor says in relief, “It’s not
her.” In fact it is, and this is confirmed for the doctor when the Pierrot brings
forth an antique snuffbox he recognizes as his wife’s. Convinced that she
there for a rendezvous with another man, the doctor has his own duplicity
turned back on him, and he follows the Pierrot to see whom she is meeting. In
the process he is awakened to a new sense of his wife’s free expression of her
sexuality by the way she rolls her hips, lets men embrace her in the crowd, and
even herself fondles the breasts of another woman. Finally, the doctor is sure
that she is not waiting for anyone in particular but was “tasting only the mon
strous pleasure of being alone, free, honest in her native brutality, of being the
one who is unknown, forever solitary and without shame, whom a little mask
and a hermetic costume had restored ... to her irremediable solitude and her
immodest innocence” (235-6).
The “hidden woman” of the title is both the wife the doctor knows beneath
her disguise and the “brutally” free woman the disguise allows her to be.
Woman’s position as “object” in the doctor’s joke doubly overdetermined, and
though he is startled by her mastery, he reassures himself that she will wear her
self out and go home. The doctor, having knowledge of her Otherness while
she remains unaware of his voyeurism, is not, in his mind, made an object in the
joking chain at all.
Yet this is only one side of the double-edged joke. In fact, the end of the
story, its “punch line,” lifts the doctors inhibitions regarding his wife’s unre
strained desire and turns the reader back to the beginning of the story, to the
wife's own lie: namely, the inhibitions she constructs against attending the ball
alone. These inhibitions are themselves offered as a posed resistance to her
husband’s pretense of granting her freedom. She constructs, with her lie, a text
of herself that the husband willing to accept
“really” her. In fact, Irene’s
construction of these inhibitions effectively places her in the first-person posi
tion on the joking/textual chain. This is, then, a joke that the doctor cannot
“get,” for his wife ever remains the “one who is unknown” to him. As the
“shameless woman” she destroys the very base from which the male-told
obscene joke is constructed. Thus, the “hidden woman,” the absence or blind
spot in the joke paradigm, surfaces as a subject who retells the joke as one in
which man’s own devices for objectifying woman become the instruments of his
undoing and result in his ultimate failure to “know” his woman.
Virginia Woolf’s “Nurse Lugton’s Curtain” (154-5) is another short-short
story that “exposes” objectified woman as the butt of the joke and in so doing
offers a revision of the joke paradigm that stresses the authority of woman’s
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subject position. As “Nurse,” wakeful Lugton is “phallic” woman, the “ogress”
in charge “with a face like the side of a mountain with great precipices and
avalanches, and chasms for her eyes and hair and nose and teeth.” But once
asleep, the wild beasts portrayed in the fabric of the curtain she is stitching
romp across her lap, the maternal site of playfulness and birth. On coming back
to wakefulness and regaining her “phallic” position, she restores the carnival
scene of the curtain to fixity and “normalcy.” At this moment of closure, Nurse
Lugton returns to her phallic position of authority as it rules by tyranny, an
authority that terrifies the children in her charge and illustrates the way women
are forced to use male forms of power in order to rule.
The “Otherness” and alternative view of feminine forms of power repre
sented by Lugton’s dreamworld and the fantastic lap scene coincide with Adri
enne Rich’s portrayal of female authority in “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers.” In both
cases, needlework — a form of creative power traditionally allowed to women
— becomes the occasion for the release of repressed desire. But Woolf’s story
rewrites the joke of totalizing repression to create a fanciful vision in which
Nurse Lugton represents herself the repressive force that in its turn must be
tamed, lulled to sleep, in order for pleasure and freedom to surface and have life.
While the joke appears to be made at the expense of Nurse Lugton, Woolf’s
rhetorical strategies reveal another twist on the position of woman as object in
the joke paradigm. By combining the motif of the sleeping ogress with the
imagery of an enchanted animal world, and by shifting from third- to secondperson narration once the Nurse falls asleep and the animal kingdom comes to
life, Woolf enables the reader to account for the story “logically” as the Nurse’s
dream. That the enchantment may be dreamt by Nurse Lugton, yet she herself
may be unaware upon waking, coincides with Freud’s theory of the forgetting
of dreams as evidence of psychical censorship (Interpretation 555). Nurse Lug
ton’s “objectified” position as the waking force of repression perhaps causes her
to “forget” her natural state of emancipation, but by means of the rhetoric of the
story, the reader “gets” the punch line and in so doing frees Nurse Lugton from
the mantle of her own repressive authority.
Both Woolf’s and Colette’s short-shorts, considered in terms of the joke
paradigm, can be read as “exposures” of woman, who from the position of object
can achieve a subject position in the joking chain. The stories cleverly make use
of the rhetorical strategies of the joke-work in order to make the male construct
of “woman” the butt of the joke. In order for woman to achieve authority she
must not only endure but also embrace the pain to which her male-defined
position subjects her. This is a lesson that can be appropriated by all minori
ties who find themselves “butted” out of the joking/textual chain, made objects
of the none-too-funny joke of cultural dominance, oppression, and imposed
silence.

4.

In conclusion, a close study of the correlations between the joke and the short
short, in light both of Freud’s model of the subject positions at stake in the joke
and of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of deterritorialization as a defining ele-
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ment of minor literature, reveals similarities between the two genres that
enhance and reinforce their narrative complexity. If, as Freud has said, the
function of the joke is to protect words and thoughts from criticism, then per
haps the "protective coloring” of the short story a "minor” genre is in fact part
of its strength. Its status as a minor genre has thus far safeguarded it from the
more voracious critical beasts roaming the narrative jungle in search of meatier
game such
the novel. As a genre that, according to Georg Lukacs, "sees
absurdity in all its undisguised and unadorned nakedness” (51-2), the short
story as a "minor” form has resisted reappropriation and reterritorialization. In
this way it has managed to preserve itself a narrative haven against the total
izing and territorializing operations required of a major literature.
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